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Norton v. State" is the only authority given for the quoted statement
in the Pfost case. Upon a check of the Norton case, and the authorities
listed therein, 12 we find that the cases merely say that if no proper
exception had been taken to a particular instruction, the mentioning
of the specific error on the motion for new trial would preserve the
question for appeal. Of course, in Wisconsin it is no longer necessary
either to take exception or to interpose any type of objection to instructions. 13

Whether there was confusion or not in the past is no longer too
important, for the Wisconsin Court has now made its position clear.
The following statement is certainly unequivocal:
"A procedural device which affords an opportunity to a trial
court to correct its own errors by directing a new trial, without
the necessity of an appeal to this court to reach the same result,
would seem to be in the public interest. During the course of a
trial the trial judge often is required to 'shoot from the hip' in
making his rulings without the benefit of briefs or time to make
an independent research of the authorities. A very different
situation prevails when the trial judge has before him after
verdict a motion for new trial grounded upon alleged error.
Time will then permit the preparation and filing of briefs by
counsel,
and for the judge to do independent research of his
14
o nv."
PAUL F. WOJTKIEWICZ

Administrative Law-Notice of Special Assessment-Action in
equity to set aside special assessments. The City of Milwaukee levied
special assessments for street improvements against property owned
by the plaintiff. Abutting landowners were given notice of the assessments by publciation, in compliance with the City Charter which provdied that notice of an assessment for street improvement benefits was
11 129 Wis. 659, 109 N.W. 531 (1906).
12 See Grabowski v. State, 126 Wis. 447, at 458, 105 N.W. 805, at 806 (1905).
'3 Wis. STATS. §270.39 (1955) ; Reuling v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. R. Co., 257

Wis. 485, 44 N.W.2d 253 (1950).
14 274 Wis. at 516. It might be argued that the trial court is not exactly forced
to "shoot from the hip" when there are objections to a proposed special verdict, as happened in this case, for there is probably no more opportune time
to excuse the jury for a few hours and hear argument.
Lest one get the idea this note is a criticism of the rule laid down, it
should be noted that some other states have the same rule. See 3 AM. JUR.,
Appeal & Error §267. Further, it should be obvious that if there is any
possibility of preventing the expense of an appeal, the possibility should be
exhausted.
The main case has already been cited with approval in two cases. In
Frion v. Craig, 274 Wis. 550, 80 N.W2d 808 (1957), the Court decided that
the trial judge's questioning of witnesses and comments during the trial
could not be raised on appeal because not raised in the motions after verdict.
In Bronk v. Mijal, 275 Wis. 194, 81 N.W.2d 481 (1957), the Court held
that although the court was requested to submit a certain question in the
special verdict, failure to move for a new trial after verdict bottomed upon
such error precluded the raising of the issue on appeal.
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sufficient if given by publication.' Plaintiff brought this action against
the City alleging that: 1) it had no actual notice of the assessment
until it was too late to protest it; 2) notice by publication was inadequate to comply with the requirements of due process of law ;2 and
that, therefore, the City Charter provisions were unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held for the defendant (City) and said
that the notice by publication was adequate. Wisconsin Electric Power
3
Company v. Milwaukee, 263 Wis. 111, 56 N.W. 2d 784 (1953).
In 1955, plaintiff obtained leave of the court to plead over and
served an amended complaint. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin again
4
held for the defendant.
On December 17, 1956, the Supreme Court of the United States
in a memorandum decision vacated the judgment of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County.
"Appeal from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Facts and
opinion, 272 Wis. 575, 76 N.W. 2d 341. Dec. 17, 1956. Per
Curiam. In this case probable jurisdiction is noted. The
judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is vacated and
the case is remanded to the Circuit Court for Milwaukee
County for consideration in the light of Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112."'5
On January 14, 1957, the Supreme Court of the United States amended
the order of December 17th so as to remand the case to the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin instead of the Circuit Court for Milvaukee
County. 6 On March 5, 1957, on motion for judgment on mandate of
the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin reversed its decision in Wisconsin Electric Power Company
v. Milwaukee and said :"
"In view of the determination made by 'the United States
supreme court we hold that the constructive notice given by
the defendant city by publication of the proposed special assessment against the plaintiff's lands did not meet the requirements
of due process. Mullane v. Central Hanover B. & T. Co., 1950,
339 U.S. 306, .

. . ,

and Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 1956,

352 U.S. 112 .... "
By this decision" the Supreme Court applied to administrative
special assessment proceedings the rule it had theretof or applied in judi1 City of Milwaukee Charter
2 WIs. CoNsT. art. 1, §13.

§§11.20, 12.07 & 14.24.

3 Discussed in 40 MARQ. L. REv. 443 (1957).
4 Wisconsin Electric Power Company v. Milwaukee, 272 Wis. 575, 76 N.W2d

341 (1955).

"

5Wisconsin Electric Power Company v. Milvaukee, 352 U.S. 948 (1956).
6352 U.S. 958 (1957).
7Wisconsin Electric Power Company v. Milwaukee, 275 Wis. 121, at 123, 81

N.W.2d 298, at 299 (1957).
8 352 U.S. 948.
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cial proceedings. The Court cited two cases when it decided the
motion for judgment on mandate of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Walker v. City of Hutchinson9 and Mullane v. CentralHanover
Bank and Trust Co.' 0
The dispute in the Walker case arose when the City of Hutchinson
filed an action to condemn part of Walker's property so as to facilitate
the widening of a street. The proceeding was instituted under a Kansas
statute;"a the court appointed three commissioners to determine compensation for the property taken. They were required by statute 2 to
give landowners at least ten days notice of the time and place of their
proceedings. The statute authorized the giving of notice either in
writing or by publication in the official city paper, the notice was given
to Walker by publication in the city paper. The statute also authorized
an appeal from the award of the commissioners if taken within thirty
days of the filing of the report. Walker took no appeal within the
prescribed period, but subsequently brought an equitable action against
the city to enjoin it from entering or trespassing on his property.
The District Court of Reno County, Kansas, denied relief and the
landowner appealed. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the
judgment.'" The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States and it said:
"The only question we find it necessary to decide is whether,
under circumstances of this kind, newspaper publication alone
measures up to the quality of notice the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires as a prerequisite to proceedings to fix compensation in condemnation cases." 114
The Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas,
giving these reasons :"s
"In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, ...,we gave thorough consideration to the problem
of adequate notice under the Due Process Clause. That case
establishes the rule that, if feasible, notice must be reasonably
calculated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly
and adversely affect their legally protected interests. We there
called attention to the impossibility of setting up a rigid formula as to the kind of notice that must be given; notice required
will vary with the circumstances and conditions. We recognized
that in some cases it might not be reasonably possible to give personal notice, for example where people are missing or unknown.
"Measured by the principles stated in the Mullane case, we
9352 U.S. 112 (1956).
lo339 U.S. 306 (1950).

11

KAN. STAT.

§26-201 (1949).

12KAN. STAT. §26-202 (1949).
'3 178 Kan. 263, 284 P.2d 1073 (1955).

14 352 U.S. 112, at 115 (1956).
15 Ibid.
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think that the notice by publication here falls short of the requirements of dueprocess. It is common knowledge that mere
newspaper publication rarely informs a landowner of proceedings against his property . .

.

. In the persent case there seem

to be no compelling or even persuasive reasons why such direct,
notice cannot be given. Appellant's name was known to the city
and was on the official records. Even a letter would have apprised him that his property was about to be taken and that he
must appear if he wanted to be heard as to its value.
"There is nothing peculiar about litigation between the
Government and its citizens that should deprive those citizens
of a right to be heard. Nor is there any reason to suspect that
it will interfere with the orderly condemnation of property to
preserve effectively the citizen's rights to a hearing in connection
with just compensation. In too many instances notice by,publication is no notice at all. It may leave government authorities
free to fix onesidedly the amount that must be paid owners for
their property taken for public use."
The Mullane case arose when a trust company published notice
of judicial hearings on settlement of accounts of the trustee of a
common trust fund. The attorney representing the interests of the
beneficiaries in the income of the fund objected on the ground that
the notice by publication was inadequate to afford due process of law
under the Constitution. 16 The Court held that the notice by publication
was insufficient; it said :27
within the limits of practicability notice must be such
as is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties. Where
the names and post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means
less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency."
It would appear that, in extending the rule of the Walker and
Mulane cases to administrative special assessment proceedings, the
Supreme Court of the United States by implication overrules the case
of Londoner v. City and County of Denver'8 which set forth the rule
that:
"In the assessment, apportionment, and collection of taxes
upon property within their jurisdiction, the Constitution of the
United States imposes few restrictions upon the states ....
Where the legislature of a state, .

. commits to some sub-

ordinate body the duty of determining whether, in what amount,
and upon whom it shall be levied and of making its assessment
and apportionment, due process of law requires that, at some
stage of the proceedings, before the tax becomes irrevocably
fixed, the taxpayer shall have an opportunity to be heard, of
16 U.S. CoNsT.

17 339 U.S.

amend. XIV, §1.

at 318.
is210 U.S. 373 (1908).
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which he must have notice, either personal, by publication, or
by a law fixing the time and place of hearing."9 [emphasis
supplied].
This departure from the old rule seems to be a sound and reasonable one. Due to the complexity of modern life the first reason for
the old rule-the likelihood that the taxpayer will know that special
assessment proceedings are pending when he sees improvements being
made upon streets abutting his property-is no longer a valid one.
The second reason for the old rule-public policy-appears to have
been taken into consideration by the Court in the formulation of the
new rule. The rule does not require the impossible or highly impractical-personal notice is required only when the names of those to
whom the notice is to be given are known or available to the one
giving the notice.
It should be noted that the new rule has direct application only
to special assessment proceedings. There is some question as to whether
it will have any effect upon the type of notice that must be given in
proceedings involving the assessment of real property taxes.
The new rule recognizes that while an administrative special assessment proceeding is a proceeding in rem,- ° and a court has jurisdiction of the property, there is nevertheless a personal interest in the
determination to be made. The recognition of this rule by the Supreme
Court of the United States is also a recognition of the trend of recent
decisions in analogous areas such as eminent domain proceedings and
tax foreclosure proceedings.
The fact that the notice in an administrative special assessment
proceeding is being given by a governmental body should not affect
the rule. There seems to be no sufficient reason for treating a governmental body any different than a private individual in this type of
case, that is, there is nothing peculiar about litigation between a government and its citizens that should deprive those citizens of a right
to be heard.
As a final point, it should be noted that the Wisconsin Legislature
has given official recognition to the new rule by the passage of Ch.
130, Laws of 1957, under which Sec. 66.60 (7) of the Wisconsin
Statutes (relating to special assessments) has been repealed and
recreated so as to require that:
". .. the city or village clerk shall cause notice to be given
stating the nature of the proposed work or improvement, the
general boundary lines of the proposed assessment district including, in the discretion of the governing body, a small map
thereof, the place and the time at which the report may be in19 Id. at 385.
For a detailed discussion of requirements of notice in in rem proceedings see
70 HARV. L. REv. 1257 (1957).

20
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spected, and the place and time at which all persons interested,
or their agents or attorneys, may appear before the governing
body and be heard concerning the matters contained in the
preliminary resolution and the report. Such notice shall be
given either by publication of a copy of the notice at least once
in a newspaper published or having a general circulation in such
city or village, or such notice shall be posted in not less than 5
public places within the city or village of which at least 3 shall
be within the assessment district and a copy of such notice shall
be mailed to every interested person whose post office address
is known, or can with reasonable diligence be ascertained, at
last 10 days before the hearing or proceeding ...." [emphasis
supplied].
HARRY G. HOLZ

